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in the Pennsylvania law. It is impossible to foresee all the problems of interpretation involved, but in providing for joinder in circumstances presenting "any
common question of law or fact" a wide latitude appears to have been granted.
The apparent purpose of the act is remedial-to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to
expedite trial of cases. In that respect it is comparable to the Scire Facias Act
to join additional defendants. 10
11
it is said that this latter act is to be
In Vinnacombe v. City of Philadelphia
strictly construed to advance the legislative purpose. A similar statement of
construction is to be expected concerning act No. 404.
Section 2 grants to the Court a wide discretion which will frequently need to
be exercised in order to avoid confusion and improper results. By this grant of
discretion the legislature has refused to concern itself with the details of application and has placed upon the Courts the responsibility for the practical
efficiency of the act. The judicial administration of this discretion may serve the
purpose of discouraging litigation over procedural matters.
Section 3 is a statement of general existing law. It is not to be expected that
any change is intended to be effected in the rules relating to joinder of parties in
appellate proceedings, and it appears obvious that there is no intent to provide for
trial of issues between plaintiffs.
It is submitted that the legislative purpose would be more certainly and fully
accomplished by a further act to eradicale any grounds for delay in bringing issues
to trial because of alleged non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. A model as adopted
2
in New Jersey is found in the English Rules of Court.1
W. 0. Garber

RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Our legislature has again widened the scope of our laws regulating the recovery of damages for injuries resulting in death. Under the act which went
into effect on April 1, 1937,1 to the persons entitled to recover damages for injuries causing death has been added the personal representative of the decedent.
The act provides that if none of the above relatives (husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased) are left 0 survive the decedent, then the per101929; Apr. 10, P. L. 479, 12

11

P. S. 141.

297 Pa. 564.

lZ(Order 16, r. 11). No action shall be defeated by the non-joinder or misjoinder of parties,
but new parties may be added and parties misjoined may be dropped, bg order, at any stage of
the cause, as the ends of justice may require. N. J. (P. L. 1912, p. 378).
lAct number 48.
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sonal representative shall be entitled to recover damages for reasonable hospital,
nursing, medical, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration necessitated
by reason of injuries causing death.

Apparently the basic purpose of this amendment is to protect a class of
creditors, (namely, hospitials, doctors, nurses, undertakers, and the personal representative) from loss because there is no proper person to sue. It is to be
regretted, however, that the legislature made it a prerequisite of such a suit that
the other persons entitled to sue must be dead. This provision prevents recovery,
and hence, protection of these creditors, where there is living a husband, widow,
children, or parents of the decedent: first, in all cases where it is sought to recover expenses of administration; and, second, where the surviving relative has
not complied with the provisions of the act of 1927, P.L. 992, where it is sought
to recover for funeral expenses. Thus, in a number of cases the payment of these
claims is contingent upon the size of the estate. The injustice of this is brought
home more forcibly since it is apparent that these expenses are directly attributable
to the wrongdoer and there is little if any reason to protect him from damages
which his wrongful act has caused.
In connection with these instances where there can be no recovery under
the direct provisions of the acts, an interesting problem is created by reason
of a recent decision of our Supreme Court. 2 Chief Justice Kephart says, concerning the prior wrongful death act, at page 153 of the opinion, that, "It would
seem just and proper that, when a prior class has no beneficial interest in the
proceeds of the recovery, but retains only the nominal right to sue and does not
exercise such right, those who are beneficially entitled should not be barred
thereby from prosecuting their claim. A proper procedure would be to allow
them to use, as plaintiff, the name of the person entitled to bring the suit." The
question is thus presented as to whether or not such a use action is available
to the personal representative. It is submitted, however, that the answer to
this problem lies in the express provision of the act, that, if none of the above relatives are left to survive the decedemt, then and only then is the personal repre-

sentative entitled to sue.
There is also a problem which arises from the language of the act itself.
The act provides that the personal representative can recover damages for . . .
expenses of administration necessitated by reason of injuries causing death.
If the framers of the act are to be taken to mean what they say, it will be

necessary for the personal representative to point to the expenses of administration
which he wishes to recover and show that they were incurred because the decedent died from certain injuries rather than a disease, or similar cause. It
is apparent that the cause of a person's death has no effect upon the expenses
of administration except perhaps the cost of the suit for damages. It is the fact
2McFadden v. May, 325 Pa. 145.
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that the person has died which gives rise to expenses of administration.
However, it should be noted that the words "necessitated by reason of injuries causing death" certainly are needed to limit hospital, nursing, medical,
and, perhaps, funeral expenses. A reasonable interpretation of the act, therefore, might be that these limiting words were not meant to modify "expenses
of administration" and, hence, should be regarded, as to them, as mere surplusage. Thus, the personal representative should be permitted to recover all
the expenses of administration.
There is, however, a third interpretation which might be placed upon these
words. The legislature could have meant those expenses of administration which
are incurred by the personal representative to put him in a position so that he is
legally entitled to maintain the suit.
Although three possible interpretations of the act have been suggested, it
is submitted that the most reasonable interpretation is the one which permits
the personal representative to recover all expenses of administration. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the amendment was not created
to permit a recovery for general damages for wrongful death, but only for
those damages which are necessary to protect a certain class of creditors of which
the personal representative is made a member. If this is true, he should be
protected as to all expenses and not merely those which are occasioned in obtaining the legal right to sue, or the mere cost of the suit itself.
Although the amendment is neither as complete nor as clear as could be
desired, it has wrought a much needed change in the pre-existing law by enlarging the class of persons entitled to recover and the recoverable damages for
injuries resulting in death.
C. M. Koontz

